Non-Deteriorating Choice by Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves
Cahier 2001-01
BOSSERT, Walter
SPRUMONT, Yves
Non-Deteriorating Choice
Département de sciences économiques 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté des arts et des sciences 
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville 
Montréal (Québec) H3C 3J7 
Canada 
http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca  
SCECO-information@UMontreal.CA 
Téléphone : (514) 343-6539 
Télécopieur : (514) 343-7221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ce cahier a également été publié par le Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en 
économie quantitative (CIREQ) sous le numéro 01-2001. 
 
This working paper was also published by the Center for Interuniversity Research in 
Quantitative Economics (CIREQ), under number 01-2001. 
 
 
 
ISSN 0709-9231 
CAHIER 2001-01
NON-DETERIORATING CHOICE*
Walter BOSSERT1 and Yves SPRUMONT1
1 Centre de recherche et développement en économique (C.R.D.E.) and Département
de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal
January 2001
__________________
* Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
and the Centre de recherche et développement en économique of the Université de
Montréal is gratefully acknowledged.
RÉSUMÉ
Une règle de sélection associe à tout ensemble d’options réalisables et tout statu quo y
appartenant un sous-ensemble des options réalisables. Une telle règle est non-dégradante s’il
existe un ordre sur l’ensemble de toutes les options concevables pour lequel les options
sélectionnées ne sont jamais pires que le statu quo. Nous caractérisons de telles règles dans
des contextes abstrait et économique.
Mots clés : fonctions de choix, rationalité individuelle, statu quo
ABSTRACT
We analyze an alternative to the standard rationalizability requirement for observed
choices by considering non-deteriorating selections. A selection function is a generalization of
a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo)
alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. A selection function is non-deteriorating if
there exists an ordering over the universal set of alternatives such that the selected
alternatives are at least as good as the reference option. We characterize non-deteriorating
selection functions in an abstract framework and in an economic environment.
Key words : choice functions, individual rationality, status quo
1 Introduction
In traditional choice theory, the decision maker is assumed to possess a preference relation
over all conceivable alternatives. It then chooses from any feasible set it may face the
maximal elements of that relation in that set. The testable restrictions implied by this
preference maximization hypothesis are well known: they constitute the so-called theory
of revealed preference pioneered by Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950), Arrow (1959),
Richter (1966), and Sen (1971), among others. Normatively appealing as it may be,
preference maximization does not have strong empirical support; in fact, rather systematic
violations have been recorded in a variety of contexts (see, for example, the surveys by
Camerer, 1994, and Shaﬁr and Tversky, 1995). Therefore, it is useful to analyze alternative
models of choice.
In this paper, we explore one such alternative. We deviate from standard choice
theory by assuming that, in each feasible set, there exists a reference alternative which,
in addition to the feasible set itself, may inﬂuence the choice of the agent. The reference
alternative can be interpreted in various ways, depending on the structure of the problem.
In general, we can think of it as an option representing the status quo. This interpretation
is appropriate, for example, in dynamic choice situations where consecutive choices are
observed. In a multi-stage choice problem of that nature, a plausible reference alternative
at a given stage is the one that has been selected in the previous stage, provided it remains
feasible. In economic environments (such as economies with private goods), it is natural
to consider endowment vectors to be the reference alternatives relevant to the choice.
The idea that the status quo matters is, of course, not novel. It dates back at least to
Simon (1955, 1956) and remained an important theme in the literature on bounded ratio-
nality ever since. Only recently, however, did Zhou (1997) approach it from the revealed
preference angle. Zhou asked the following general question: what testable restrictions,
if any, are implied by theories of bounded rationality where the status quo plays a role?
He then focused on one such theory according to which the agent maximizes a “quasi-
complete” transitive relation over the set of alternatives that are better than the status
quo.
The alternative rationality requirement we consider in this paper merely demands that
there exist an ordering (or indeed just a transitive preference relation) according to which
the observed choices never make the agent worse oﬀ than the reference alternative. This
requirement, which is devoid of any idea of maximization, is often referred to as indi-
vidual rationality. However, to avoid confusion with the rationality requirement imposed
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in revealed preference theory, we prefer to speak of non-deteriorating choice. Though
non-deteriorating choice is a weak behavioral assumption, it is far from being a vacuous
requirement: as shown in this paper, it yields substantial testable restrictions on observed
choices.
Our general model is basically the same as the one in Zhou (1997). A selection
function assigns to each pair of a feasible set and a reference alternative (required to be
an element of the feasible set) a set of chosen alternatives which is a subset of the feasible
set. This selection function is non-deteriorating if there exists a preference ordering over
the universal set of alternatives such that, for all elements in the domain of the selection
function, all chosen alternatives are at least as good as the reference alternative. As
is the case for rational choice, the formulation of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
non-deteriorating choice depends crucially on the domain of the selection function. We
analyze two types of domains in this paper. The ﬁrst deals with the case where no
restrictions are imposed on the structure of the domain. Second, we discuss a more
structured environment where alternatives are represented as vectors in a Euclidean space.
These vectors can be interpreted as consumption bundles and, therefore, it is natural to
impose additional regularity requirements such as continuity, monotonicity, or convexity
on preference relations for which the observed choices are non-deteriorating.
In Section 2, we present the abstract version of our model. We provide a necessary and
suﬃcient condition that is analogous to Richter’s (1966) congruence axiom characterizing
rational choice. In order to avoid degenerate situations where any selection function is
declared non-deteriorating by employing the universal indiﬀerence relation, we require the
relation for which the selection function is non-deteriorating to be antisymmetric in that
section.
Section 3 deals with economic environments. This more structured version of our
model lends itself to empirical testing. With this application in mind, we restrict the
domain of the selection function to be ﬁnite, in which case an equivalent formulation in
terms of data sets can be employed. Again, we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for non-deteriorating choice, where natural restrictions are imposed on the relation for
which the selections are non-deteriorating. While we do not assume antisymmetry in
this section, we employ monotonicity and convexity assumptions and characterize non-
deteriorating choice in three cases: for strictly monotonic preferences, for strictly convex
preferences, and for preference orderings that are strictly monotonic and strictly convex.
It should be noted that adding continuity to the list of properties of the relation does not
have any consequences: continuity by itself imposes no testable restrictions at all (again,
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the universal indiﬀerence relation can be employed to demonstrate this observation) and,
in the context of ﬁnite economic domains, it is redundant when strict monotonicity or
strict convexity are imposed in the ﬁrst place.
Section 4 concludes, and the equivalence between selection functions and data sets in
the case of economic environments with ﬁnite domains is established in the Appendix.
2 Abstract Choices
Let N (N0) denote the set of positive (nonnegative) integers and, for m ∈ N, let Rm denote
Euclidean m-space. Let X be a nonempty set of alternatives. The set of all nonempty
subsets of X is denoted by P(X). A quasi-ordering over X is a reﬂexive and transitive
binary relation R ⊆ X×X, and an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering. The symmetric
and asymmetric factors of R are denoted by I and P . The relation R is antisymmetric if,
for all x, y ∈ X, xIy implies x = y.
A (selection) problem is a pair (S, x) such that S ∈ P(X) and x ∈ S. We interpret
S as the feasible set of alternatives and x as the reference point for the problem under
consideration. The domain of problems is denoted by D. We assume that D is nonempty
but otherwise, no restrictions are imposed in this section.
A selection function is a mapping C:D → P(X) such that C(S, x) ⊆ S for all (S, x) ∈
D. Note that C(S, x) could contain several alternatives but single-valued choices are
included as a special case.
Given an ordering R over X, a selection function C is non-deteriorating for R if xRy
for all (S, y) ∈ D and for all x ∈ C(S, y).
In the characterization result of this section, we restrict attention to selection functions
that are non-deteriorating for an antisymmetric ordering to prevent the concept of non-
deterioration from becoming vacuous. Clearly, without a restriction such as antisymmetry,
any selection function would be non-deteriorating for the universal indiﬀerence relation.
An obvious necessary condition for a selection function to be non-deteriorating for
an antisymmetric ordering is that if, for some problem, an alternative y is chosen when
x = y is the reference alternative, then x cannot be chosen for any problem where y is
the reference alternative. Consider the following example.
Example 1. Let X = {x, y} and D = {({x, y}, x), ({x, y}, y)}, and deﬁne the selection
function C by letting C({x, y}, x) = {y} and C({x, y}, y) = {x}. It is immediate that C
cannot be non-deteriorating for any antisymmetric relation R over X.
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On the other hand, the above-described requirement is not suﬃcient for non-deteriorating
choice for a transitive and antisymmetric relation, as demonstrated in the following ex-
ample.
Example 2. Let X = {x, y, z} and D = {(S,w) : S ∈ P(X), |S| = 2, and w ∈ S}.
Deﬁne the selection function C by letting
C({x, y}, x) = C({x, y}, y) = {x},
C({y, z}, y) = C({y, z}, z) = {y},
C({x, z}, x) = C({x, z}, z) = {z}.
C satisﬁes the above condition but it is not non-deteriorating for any transitive and
antisymmteric relation R.
Example 2 suggests that no cycles of revealed preference should occur. Therefore, a
necessary and suﬃcient condition has to take into consideration the transitive closure of
direct revealed preferences. To formulate such a necessary and suﬃcient condition, we
introduce the following direct and indirect revealed preference relations associated with
a selection function C. These relations are analogous to those that are familiar from the
literature on rational choice.
The direct revealed preference relation RC associated with C is deﬁned as follows. For
all x, y ∈ X, xRCy if there exists S ∈ P(X) such that (S, y) ∈ D and x ∈ C(S, y).
The (indirect) revealed preference relation RC corresponding to C is the transitive
closure of RC . Formally, it is deﬁned by letting, for all x, y ∈ X, xRCy if there existK ∈ N
and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x = x0, y = xK , and xk−1RCxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Clearly,
RC ⊆ RC. (1)
The following axiom is analogous to Richter’s (1966) congruence axiom which is neces-
sary and suﬃcient for the rationalizability of a choice function with an arbitrary domain.
ND-Congruence. For all x, y ∈ X such that x = y, for all S ∈ P(X) such that
(S, x) ∈ D, if xRCy, then y ∈ C(S, x).
Before stating the main theorem of this section, we provide the following lemma which
will be used in the proof.
Lemma 1. If R is an antisymmetric ordering for which C is a non-deteriorating selection
function, then RC ⊆ R.
Proof. Suppose C is non-deteriorating for an antisymmetric ordering R.
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First, we show that RC ⊆ R. Suppose xRCy for x, y ∈ X. Then there exists S ∈ P(X)
such that (S, y) ∈ D and x ∈ C(S, y). Because C is non-deteriorating for R, this implies
xRy.
Now suppose xRCy for x, y ∈ X. Then there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such
that x = x0, y = xK , and xk−1RCxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} Because RC ⊆ R, it follows
that xk−1Rxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Because R is transitive, this implies xRy.
The above lemma is analogous to the relationship between the revealed preference
relation and a rationalizing relation in the context of rational choice (see, for example,
Samuelson, 1938, 1948, and Richter, 1971).
We are now ready to prove:
Theorem 1. There exists an antisymmetric ordering R for which C is non-deteriorating
if and only if C satisﬁes ND-Congruence.
Proof. (a) “Only if.” Suppose C is non-deteriorating for an antisymmetric ordering R
over X. By way of contradiction, suppose C violates ND-Congruence. Then there exist
x, y ∈ X with x = y and S ∈ P(X) such that (S, x) ∈ D, xRCy, and y ∈ C(S, x). By
deﬁnition, this implies yRCx and, by (1) and Lemma 1, yRx. Because xRCy, Lemma 1
implies xRy. Because x = y, this contradicts the antisymmetry of R.
(b) “If.” Suppose C satisﬁes ND-Congruence. First, we prove that RC is antisym-
metric. By way of contradiction, suppose there exist x, y ∈ X with x = y such that
xRCy and yRCx. Then there exist K,L ∈ N, x0, . . . , xK ∈ X, and z0, . . . , zL ∈ X such
that x = x0 = zL, y = xK = z0, xk−1RCxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and z−1RCz for all
 ∈ {1, . . . , L}. This implies xRCzL−1. Because zL−1RCzL = x, there exists S ∈ P(X)
such that (S, x) ∈ D and zL−1 ∈ C(S, x). But this contradicts ND-Congruence.
Now deﬁne the ordering R∗ over X by letting, for all x, y ∈ X, xR∗y if and only if
xRCy or x = y. Clearly, R∗ is reﬂexive and, because RC is transitive and antisymmetric,
so is R∗. By Szpilrajn’s (1930) result on extending transitive and antisymmetric quasi-
orderings, there exists an antisymmetric ordering R over X such that
R∗ ⊆ R. (2)
It remains to be shown that C is non-deteriorating for R. Suppose x ∈ C(S, y) for some
x, y ∈ X and S ∈ P(X) such that (S, y) ∈ D. Then xRCy by deﬁnition of the direct
revealed preference relation. Furthermore, by (1), Lemma 1, and (2), we have
RC ⊆ RC ⊆ R∗ ⊆ R
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and, hence, xRy.
As is apparent from the proof of Theorem 1, ND-Congruence remains necessary and
suﬃcient for non-deteriorating choice if the assumption that R is an ordering is weakened
to transitivity. Note that RC is a transitive relation for which a selection function satis-
fying ND-Congruence is non-deteriorating, and the part of the above proof extending RC
to the ordering R could be omitted if R is merely required to be transitive. Furthermore,
the “only if” part of the proof and Lemma 1 remain valid if R is transitive without having
any further properties. Thus, the testable restrictions identiﬁed in the theorem are robust
with respect to weakening the requirements on the relation R.
3 Economic Choices
In this section, we turn to economic environments: the universal set X is Rm, m-
dimensional vectors are interpreted as commodity bundles, and preferences are orderings
over Rm. Our notation for vector inequalities is ≥, >, .
The following concept will prove convenient. A data set is a mapping (s, e, c) from some
nonempty and ﬁnite index set T into P(Rm)×Rm×Rm such that, for each t ∈ T, e(t) ∈ s(t)
and c(t) ∈ s(t). We interpret s(t) as the feasible set at “time” t or at “observation” t,
and e(t) and c(t) as the endowment and consumption choice at t. This formulation is in
fact equivalent to the selection function formulation used in Section 2, provided that the
domain under consideration is ﬁnite; see the Appendix for details. From now on, we ﬁx
T.
If (s, e, c) is a data set and R is a preference ordering on Rm, we say that (s, e, c) is
non-deteriorating for R if, for all t ∈ T, c(t) R e(t).
Our goal is to identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a data set to be non-
deteriorating for some preference ordering R satisfying suitable restrictions. We say that
R is strictly monotonic if, for all x, y ∈ Rm, x > y ⇒ xPy. We call R strictly convex
if, for all distinct x, y ∈ Rm and for all λ ∈ (0, 1), xRy ⇒ [λx + (1 − λ)y]Py. We shall
consider strictly monotonic orderings in the ﬁrst subsection and strictly convex orderings
in the second. The third subsection deals with orderings that are strictly monotonic and
strictly convex.
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3.1 Strict Monotonicity
For any Y ⊆ Rm, deﬁne up Y = {x ∈ Rm : there exists y ∈ Y such that x ≥ y} and low
Y = {y ∈ Y : there is no x ∈ Y such that x < y}. Consider the following condition on a
data set (s, e, c).
No Strong Dominance. For every nonempty Q ⊆ T such that c(Q) = low c(Q) and
e(Q) ⊆ up c(Q), there is a nonempty Q0 ⊆ Q such that e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0).
If we restrict attention to those subsets of T which are singletons, this condition implies
that for all t ∈ T , e(t) ≥ c(t) ⇒ e(t) = c(t), a condition we call No Direct Dominance.
This condition is necessary if (s, e, c) is to be non-deteriorating for a strictly monotonic
preference ordering. No Strong Dominance, however, is more demanding, as the following
example shows.
Example 3. Let m = 2, T = {1, 2}, and s(1) = s(2) = R2. Assume e(1) = c(2) = (2, 0),
c(1) = (0, 1), and e(2) = (1, 2). It is easily seen that there is no strictly monotonic
preference ordering for which this data set is non-deteriorating. No Direct Dominance is
satisﬁed but No Strong Dominance is violated.
On the other hand, No Strong Dominance does not rule out all forms of dominance of
the endowments over the choices, as our next example illustrates.
Example 4. Let again m = 2, T = {1, 2}, and s(1) = s(2) = R2. Assume e(1) = (1, 0),
c(1) = (0, 1), and e(2) = c(2) = (2, 2). Note that for each t there is a t′ for which
e(t′) ≥ c(t), and this inequality is strict for some pair of indices, namely t = 1, t′ = 2.
Yet, it is easy to ﬁnd a strictly monotonic preference ordering for which this data set is
non-deteriorating. No Strong Dominance is satisﬁed.
We are now ready to prove:
Theorem 2. There exists a strictly monotonic preference ordering R for which (s, e, c)
is non-deteriorating if and only if (s, e, c) satisﬁes No Strong Dominance.
Proof. Since the feasible set mapping s plays no role in the proof, we drop it from our
notation.
(a) “Only if.” Fix a data set (e, c) and letR be a strictly monotonic preference ordering
for which (e, c) is non-deteriorating, that is,
for all t ∈ T, c(t) R e(t). (3)
Let Q ⊆ T be a nonempty set such that
c(Q) = low c(Q) (4)
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and
e(Q) ⊆ up c(Q). (5)
Let f(Q) = e(Q)∪c(Q) and deﬁneW to be the set of worst elements in f(Q) according
to R, that is, W = {x ∈ f(Q) : for all y ∈ f(Q), yRx}. Since R is an ordering and f(Q)
is nonempty and ﬁnite, W is nonempty. By strict monotonicity of R, W ⊆ low f(Q). By
(4) and (5), low f(Q) = low c(Q) = c(Q). Therefore, W ⊆ c(Q). Deﬁne the nonempty
set
Q0 = {t ∈ Q : c(t) ∈W}.
Since W ⊆ c(Q), W = c(Q0). To complete the proof, it suﬃces to check that e(Q0) ⊆
c(Q0). Fix t ∈ Q0. By deﬁnition, c(t) ∈W, and it follows from (3) that e(t) ∈W = c(Q0),
as desired.
(b) “If.” Let (e, c) satisfy No Strong Dominance.
Step 1. We ﬁrst claim that No Strong Dominance implies the following condition.
For every nonempty Q ⊆ T such that c(Q) = low c(Q) and e(Q) ⊆ up c(Q), there is a
nonempty set Q
0 ⊆ Q such that e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0) and
c(Q \Q0) ∩ c(Q0) = ∅. (6)
To prove this claim, let Q ⊆ T be a nonempty set such that c(Q) = low c(Q) and
e(Q) ⊆ up c(Q). By No Strong Dominance, there is a nonempty Q0 ⊆ Q such that
e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0). (7)
Let Q0∗ be the union of all nonempty subsets Q0 of Q satisfying property (7). Because
that property is preserved under unions, Q0∗ possesses it. If c(Q \Q0∗) ∩ c(Q0∗) = ∅, we
are done. Otherwise, let
Q = Q \ {q ∈ Q0∗ : ∃t ∈ Q \Q0∗ such that c(q) = c(t)}.
Clearly, ∅ = Q ⊆ Q and c(Q) = c(Q). Hence, c(Q) = low c(Q) and e(Q) ⊆ e(Q) ⊆ up
c(Q) = up c(Q). We may therefore apply No Strong Dominance again and conclude that
there exists a nonempty Q
0 ⊆ Q such that e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0). To complete the proof, we
check property (6). By deﬁnition of Q0∗, we know that Q
0 ⊆ Q0∗. Since Q0 ⊆ Q ∩Q0∗, it
follows from the deﬁnition of Q that c(Q \Q0) ∩ c(Q0) = ∅, as desired.
Step 2. Let f(T ) = e(T ) ∪ c(T ). We deﬁne an algorithm that yields a partition
{X0, X1, . . . , XJ} of f(T ) and construct a strictly monotonic preference ordering R whose
indiﬀerence sets in f(T ) are, from worst to best, X0, X1, . . . , XJ .
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To deﬁne the algorithm, let F0 = f(T ). At step i ∈ N0, we construct Fi+1 by removing
from Fi a set Xi that we deﬁne as follows. First, let
X1(Fi) = {x ∈ low Fi : there is no t ∈ T such that x = c(t)}, (8)
X2(Fi) = {x ∈ low Fi : for all t ∈ T, x = c(t)⇒ e(t) /∈ Fi}. (9)
If both of these sets are empty, deﬁne X3(Fi) as follows. If Fi = ∅, let X3(Fi) = ∅.
Otherwise, let
Ti = {t ∈ T : c(t) ∈ low Fi}.
Clearly, c(Ti) = low c(Ti). Moreover, since X1(Fi) = X2(Fi) = ∅, we know that Ti = ∅
and e(Ti) ⊆ up c(Ti). By No Strong Dominance and Step 1, there must exist a nonempty
T 0i ⊆ Ti such that
e(T 0i ) ⊆ c(T 0i ), (10)
and
c(Ti \ T 0i ) ∩ c(T 0i ) = ∅. (11)
Pick any such set and let
X3(Fi) = c(T
0
i ).
Deﬁne, for each i ∈ N0,
Xi =



X1(Fi) if X1(Fi) = ∅,
X2(Fi) if X
1(Fi) = ∅ = X2(Fi),
X3(Fi) if X1(Fi) = X2(Fi) = ∅.
(12)
First, note that there is a nonnegative integer J < |f(T )| such that Xi = ∅ = Xj
whenever i ≤ J < j. Moreover, each x in f(T ) belongs to Xi for one and only one
i ∈ {0, . . . , J}.
Second, observe that for each i ∈ {0, . . . , J}, we have Xi ⊆ low Fi. This implies that,
for all x, y ∈ Xi, neither x < y nor x > y.
These two observations allow us to construct a strictly monotonic preference ordering
R on Rm whose indiﬀerence sets in f(T ) are, from worst to best, X0, . . . , XJ .
Step 3. We show that (e, c) is non-deteriorating for R. To that end, we claim that,
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , J}, and for all t ∈ T,
c(t) ∈ Xi ⇒ there exists j ∈ {0, . . . , i} such that e(t) ∈ Xj .
To check this claim, ﬁx t ∈ T and assume c(t) ∈ Xi. By (8) and (12), X1(Fi) = ∅. If
Xi = X2(Fi), (8), (9), and (12) imply that e(t) /∈ Fi. Hence, e(t) ∈ Xj for some j < i, and
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we are done. Finally, assume Xi = X3(Fi). Since this set is nonempty (as c(t) belongs to
it), there is a nonempty set T 0i satisfying (10) and (11) such that Xi = c(T
0
i ). By (11),
c(t) ∈ c(T 0i )⇒ t ∈ T 0i . Hence, from (10), e(t) ∈ c(T 0i ) and, therefore, e(t) ∈ Xi.
3.2 Strict Convexity
If Y is a convex subset of Rm, an extreme point of Y is a point y ∈ Y such that
[x, z ∈ Y, λ ∈ (0, 1), and y = λx+ (1− λ)z]⇒ [x = y = z].
For any Y ⊆ Rm, we let co Y denote the convex hull of Y and we denote by extco Y the
set of extreme points of co Y. Consider the following condition on a data set (s, e, c).
No Strong Inclusion. For every nonempty Q ⊆ T such that c(Q) = extco c(Q) and
e(Q) ⊆ co c(Q), there is a nonempty Q0 ⊆ Q such that e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0).
The formal similarity with No Strong Dominance is worth pointing out: the “extco”
operator replaces “low” while “co” replaces “up.” In the example below, No Strong
Inclusion is violated.
Example 5. In all examples, m = 2 and s(t) = R2 for all t ∈ T.
(a) Let T = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose c(1) = (0, 0), c(2) = (4, 0), c(3) = (0, 4), while e(1) =
(1, 1), e(2) = (2, 1), e(3) = (1, 2). Since e(T ) is in the interior of the convex hull of c(T ),
No Strong Inclusion is clearly violated. There is no strictly convex preference ordering for
which this data set is non-deteriorating. For suppose R were such an ordering. Assume,
without loss of generality, that c(t) R c(1) for all t ∈ T. By strict convexity, e(1)Pc(1), a
contradiction.
(b) Again, let T = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose c(1) = e(2) = (0, 0), c(2) = e(3) = (4, 0),
c(3) = (0, 4), and e(1) = (1, 1). It is easily checked that there is no strictly convex
preference ordering for which this data set is non-deteriorating. No Strong Inclusion is
violated.
(c) Finally, let T = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Deﬁne c and e on {1, 2, 3} as in (b) and let c(4) = (0, 0),
e(4) = (0, 4). Here again, c(T ) = extco c(T ), e(T ) ⊆ co c(T ), but there is a nonempty
set T 0 ⊆ T such that e(T 0) ⊆ c(T 0), namely, T 0 = {2, 3, 4}. No Strong Inclusion is
nevertheless violated. Contrary to the previous examples, “the violation occurs in a
strict subset of T,” namely, Q = {1, 2, 3} : there is no nonempty Q0 ⊆ Q such that
e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0). There is no strictly convex preference ordering for which this data set is
non-deteriorating.
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No Strong Inclusion does not rule out all instances of inclusion of the endowments in
the convex hull of the choices. The following example makes this point clear.
Example 6. Let m = 2 and s(t) = R2 for all t ∈ T.
(a) Let T = {1, 2, 3} and c(1) = e(2) = (0, 0), c(2) = e(3) = (4, 0), c(3) = e(1) = (0, 4).
Obviously, there is a strictly convex preference ordering for which this data set is non-
deteriorating: it suﬃces to declare all endowment and choices in the data set indiﬀerent.
No Strong Inclusion is satisﬁed.
(b) Let T = {1, 2, 3} and c(1) = (0, 0), c(2) = e(3) = (4, 0), c(3) = e(2) = (0, 4), and
e(1) = (1, 1). This example is quite close to Example 5 (b) above. Here, however, our
condition is satisﬁed and there is a strictly convex preference ordering for which the data
set is non-deteriorating. We are now ready to state:
Theorem 3. There exists a strictly convex preference ordering R for which (s, e, c) is
non-deteriorating if and only if (s, e, c) satisﬁes No Strong Inclusion.
Proof. Mutatis mutandis, the proof is the same as that of Theorem 2. The only required
changes are as follows: i) replace every instance of “low” with “extco” and every instance
of “up” with “co;” ii) replace every instance of “monotonic(ity)” with “convex(ity)” and
every instance of “No Strong Dominance” with “No Strong Inclusion;” and iii) in the
second observation in Step 2, replace the phrase “for all x, y ∈ Xi, neither x < y nor
x > y” with “every x ∈ Xi is an extreme point of the convex hull of Xi.”
3.3 Strict Monotonicity and Strict Convexity
If we require a preference ordering to be strictly monotonic and strictly convex, the
conjunction of No Strong Dominance and No Strong Inclusion is not suﬃcient to guarantee
non-deteriorating choice. Consider the following example.
Example 7. Let m = 2, T = {1, 2}, s(t) = R2 for all t ∈ T, c(1) = (4, 0), c(2) = (0, 4),
e(1) = (3, 2), and e(2) = (2, 3). This data set satisﬁes No Strong Dominance and No
Strong Inclusion but it is not non-deteriorating for any strictly monotonic and strictly
convex preference ordering. For suppose R were such an ordering. Assume, without
loss of generality, that c(2) R c(1). By strict monotonicity and strict convexity, e(1) =
(3, 2) P (2, 2) = [ 1
2
c(1) + 1
2
c(2)] P c(1), a contradiction.
The following axiom turns out to be necessary and suﬃcient for non-deteriorating
choice, given the properties of preferences imposed in this subsection.
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No Extended Dominance. For every nonempty Q ⊆ T such that c(Q) = extco low co
c(Q) and e(Q) ⊆ up co c(Q), there is a nonempty Q0 ⊆ Q such that e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0).
Before stating the characterization result of this subsection formally, we present the
following lemma. It introduces a property of the operator “extco low co” that will be
used in the proof.
Lemma 2. For all nonempty Y ⊆ Rm, extco low co Y ⊆ Y .
Proof. Suppose
x ∈ extco low co Y . (13)
This implies x ∈ co Y . Hence, there exist a positive integer K, K distinct points
x1, . . . , xK ∈ Y , and positive numbers α1, . . . , αK such that ∑Kk=1 αk = 1 and x =∑K
k=1 α
kxk.
If K = 1, then x = x1 ∈ Y and we are done. Now suppose K > 1 and, by way of
contradiction, x ∈ Y . By (13), there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that xk ∈ low co Y , say,
k = 1. Because x1 ∈ Y ⊆ co Y , this means that there exists y1 ∈ co Y such that y1 < x1.
Deﬁne y = α1y1 +
∑K
k=2 α
kxk. Clearly y ∈ co Y and y < x. Therefore x ∈ low co Y ,
contradicting (13) since obviously extco low co Y ⊆ low co Y .
The following theorem characterizes non-deteriorating choice for strictly monotonic
and strictly convex preferences. Though the structure of the proof is analogous to that of
Theorem 2, we present it in detail because the complexity of the operator “extco low co”
necessitates some more elaborate arguments than those employed in the proof of Theorem
2.
Theorem 4. There exists a strictly monotonic and strictly convex preference ordering
R for which (s, e, c) is non-deteriorating if and only if (s, e, c) satisﬁes No Extended
Dominance.
Proof. Again, because the mapping s is irrelevant for the proof, we omit it from our
notation.
(a) “Only if.” Fix a data set (e, c), and let R be a strictly monotonic and strictly
convex ordering for which (e, c) is non-deteriorating. Therefore,
for all t ∈ T, c(t) R e(t). (14)
Let Q ⊆ T be a nonempty set such that
c(Q) = extco low co c(Q) (15)
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and
e(Q) ⊆ up co c(Q). (16)
Let f(Q) = e(Q)∪ c(Q).
Step 1. We prove that
extco low co f(Q) ⊆ extco low co c(Q). (17)
Suppose
x ∈ extco low co f(Q). (18)
By Lemma 2, x ∈ f(Q).
Because of (15), we need only show that x ∈ c(Q).
Suppose, by contradiction, that x ∈ c(Q so that, necessarily, x ∈ e(Q). We ﬁrst claim
that
x ∈ low co c(Q). (19)
Indeed, by (16), x ∈ up co c(Q). If x ∈ up co c(Q)\ co c(Q), there exists y ∈ co c(Q) ⊆ co
f(Q) such that y < x. Therefore x ∈ low co f(Q), contradicting (18). Hence, x ∈ co
c(Q). Now, if (19) is false, there exists y ∈ co c(Q) ⊆ co f(Q) such that y < x, hence
x ∈ low co f(Q), contradicting (18).
Next, because of (19) and since x ∈ c(Q) = extco low co c(Q), there exist an integer
K > 1, K distinct points x1, . . . , xK ∈ low co c(Q), and positive numbers α1, . . . , αK such
that
∑K
k=1 α
k = 1 and x =
∑K
k=1 α
kxk. By (18), there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that
xk ∈ low co f(Q), say, k = 1. Because x1 ∈ co c(Q) ⊆ co f(Q), this means that there
exists y1 ∈ co f(Q) such that y1 < x1. Then again, y = α1y1 +∑Kk=2 αkxk ∈ co f(Q) and
y < x. Hence, x ∈ low co f(Q), contradicting (18). This completes the proof of (17).
Step 2. Let W = {x ∈ f(Q) : for all y ∈ f(Q), yRx}. Because R is an ordering and
f(Q) is ﬁnite, W = ∅. We claim that
W ⊆ extco low co f(Q). (20)
Suppose x ∈W . First, we prove that x ∈ low co f(Q). If not, there exists y ∈ co f(Q)
such that y < x. The strict monotonicity of R implies xPy. If y ∈ f(Q), x cannot be a
worst element in f(Q), contradicting the assumption x ∈W . If y ∈ co f(Q) \ f(Q), there
exist an integer K > 1, K distinct points x1, . . . , xK ∈ f(Q), and K positive numbers
α1, . . . , αK ∈ f(Q) such that ∑KK=1 αk = 1 and y =
∑K
k=1 α
kxk. Because R is strictly
convex, yPxk for some k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Because R is transitive, it follows that xPxk,
again contradicting the assumption that x is a worst element in f(Q).
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To complete the proof of (20), suppose, by way of contradiction, that x ∈ extco low
co f(Q). Because x ∈ low co f(Q) as just proven, this implies that there exist an integer
K > 1, K distinct points x1, . . . , xK ∈ f(Q), and K positive numbers α1, . . . , αK ∈ low
co f(Q) such that
∑K
K=1 α
k = 1 and x =
∑K
k=1 α
kxk. Because these points xk can be
chosen to be in f(Q), the convexity of R again yields a contradiction to the assumption
x ∈W . This proves (20).
Step 3. By (17) and (15), extco low co f(Q) ⊆ extco low co c(Q) = c(Q) and, hence,
W ⊆ c(Q). (21)
Deﬁning Q0 = {t ∈ Q : c(t) ∈W}, it follows from (21) that W = c(Q0). To complete the
proof of part (a), it remains to be shown that e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0). If t ∈ Q0, then c(t) ∈ W
and, from (14) and the deﬁnition of W , e(t) ∈W . Because W = c(Q0), we conclude that
e(t) ∈ c(Q0), as desired.
(b) “If.” Let (e, c) satisfy No Extended Dominance.
Step 1. Our ﬁrst claim is that No Extended Dominance implies the following condition.
For every nonempty Q ⊆ T such that c(Q) = extco low co c(Q) and e(Q) ⊆ up co c(Q),
there is a nonempty set Q
0 ⊆ Q such that e(Q0) ⊆ c(Q0) and c(Q \ Q0) ∩ c(Q0) = ∅.
Because the proof of this claim can be obtained from Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 2
by a change in notation, we omit it here.
Step 2. Let f(T ) = e(T ) ∪ c(T ). We deﬁne an algorithm that yields a partition
{X0, X1, . . . , XJ} of f(T ) and construct a strictly monotonic and strictly convex preference
ordering R whose indiﬀerence sets in f(T ) are, from worst to best, X0, X1, . . . , XJ .
To deﬁne the algorithm, let F0 = f(T ). At step i ∈ N0, we construct Fi+1 by removing
from Fi a set Xi that we deﬁne as follows. First, let
X1(Fi) = {x ∈ extco low co Fi : there is no t ∈ T such that x = c(t)},
X2(Fi) = {x ∈ extco low co Fi : for all t ∈ T, x = c(t)⇒ e(t) /∈ Fi}.
If both of these sets are empty, deﬁne X3(Fi) as follows. If Fi = ∅, let X3(Fi) = ∅.
Otherwise, let
Ti = {t ∈ T : c(t) ∈ extco low co Fi}.
We claim
c(Ti) = extco low co c(Ti). (22)
To prove (22), note ﬁrst that
extco low co c(Ti) ⊆ c(Ti) (23)
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follows from Lemma 2. Because X1(Fi) = ∅, it follows that
c(Ti) = ext low co Fi. (24)
To complete the proof of (22), it remains to show that extco low co Fi ⊆ ext low co c(Ti).
First, we prove that extco low co Fi ⊆ low co c(Ti). Let x ∈ extco low co Fi. By
(24), x ∈ c(Ti) ⊆ co c(Ti). Suppose x ∈ low co c(Ti). Then there exists y ∈ co c(Ti) ⊆ co
Fi such that y < x, implying x ∈ low co Fi and hence x ∈ extco low co Fi, the desired
contradiction.
Now suppose x ∈ extco low co Fi but x ∈ extco low co c(Ti). Because x ∈ low co
c(Ti), there exist an integer K > 1, K distinct points x1, . . . , xK ∈ extco low co c(Ti),
and positive numbers α1, . . . , αK such that
∑K
k=1 α
k = 1 and x =
∑K
k=1 α
kxk. By (23)
and (24), x1, . . . , xK ∈ c(Ti) = extco low co Fi, which implies x ∈ extco low co Fi, a
contradiction which completes the proof of (22).
Next, we prove that
e(Ti) ⊆ up co c(Ti). (25)
Because X2(Fi) = ∅, e(Ti) ⊆ Fi. Because X1(Fi) = ∅, (24) is true. Therefore, the proof
of (25) is completed by showing that Fi ⊆ up co extco low co Fi or, equivalently, Fi ⊆ up
co low co Fi.
Let x ∈ Fi. This implies x ∈ co Fi. If x ∈ low co Fi, then x ∈ up co low co Fi because
low co Fi ⊆ up co low co Fi. If x ∈ co Fi \ low co Fi, there exists y ∈ co Fi such that
y < x, and we can choose y ∈ low co Fi ⊆ co low co Fi. Hence x ∈ up co low co Fi, which
completes the proof of (25).
By (22), (25), No Extended Dominance, and Step 1, there is a nonempty T 0i ⊆ Ti such
that e(T 0i ) ⊆ c(T 0i ) and c(Ti \ T 0i ) ∩ c(T 0i ) = ∅. Pick any such set and let
X3(Fi) = c(T
0
i ).
Deﬁne, for each i ∈ N0,
Xi =


X1(Fi) if X1(Fi) = ∅,
X2(Fi) if X1(Fi) = ∅ = X2(Fi),
X3(Fi) if X1(Fi) = X2(Fi) = ∅.
The ﬁrst observation of Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 2 is true again and the second
observation is true if “Xi ⊆ low Fi” is replaced with “Xi ⊆ extco low co Fi.” The rest of
the proof is identical to the rest of the proof of Theorem 2.
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4 Concluding Remarks
Non-deteriorating choice is a consistency requirement that deviates from the standard
rational choice model by not requiring choices to be best or maximal elements—selected
alternatives merely have to be at least as good as a given reference option. This paper
provides an analysis of this condition, and we identify testable restrictions on observed
choices that allow us to check whether these choices conform to the behavioural hypothesis
on which non-deteriorating choice is based.
We did not explicitly include continuity as a property of a preference ordering for which
a data set is non-deteriorating. The reason is that continuity does not add any restrictions,
neither by itself nor in conjunction with any combination of the other properties considered
here. Note that if continuity alone is imposed on R, any data set is non-deteriorating for
the universal indiﬀerence relation R. Furthermore, the orderings constructed in the proofs
of Theorems 2 and 3 can be chosen to be continuous and, therefore, it is not necessary to
impose this property explicitly.
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions presented in Section 3 are formulated directly
in terms of the observed data sets rather than employing a revealed preference approach
analogous to the one used in Section 2. Given that the economic environment has con-
siderable structure as compared to the abstract model, we believe those formulations are
more transparent than conditions involving transitive closures of direct revealed prefer-
ences. However, revealed preference approaches could be examined as alternatives. For
example, in the case of strictly monotonic preference orderings, consider the following
construction. For all x, y ∈ e(T ) ∪ c(T ), let xRMC y if x ≥ y or there exists t ∈ T such
that x = c(t) and y = e(t). The transitive closure of RMC is denoted by R
M
C . The follow-
ing axiom is necessary and suﬃcient for non-deteriorating choice for strictly monotonic
preferences; details are available on request.
NDM-Congruence. For all x, y ∈ e(T )∪ c(T ), if xRMC y and y ≥ x, then y = x.
We restrict attention to single-agent choice situations in this paper. A natural sugges-
tion for an extension is to examine non-deteriorating choice, possibly together with other
restrictions such as eﬃciency, in a multi-agent setting. This could be accomplished by
using a framework analogous to the one employed in Bossert and Sprumont (2000) where
core rationalizability is examined in a two-agent exchange economy.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we illustrate that, in the case of an economic environment, the formu-
lation of our problem in terms of a ﬁnite data set is equivalent to the selection function
formulation with a ﬁnite domain.
We ﬁrst show how a selection correspondence can be derived from a given (ﬁnite) data
set. Suppose X = Rm, T = {1, . . . , |T |} with |T | ∈ N, and (s, e, c):T → P(X)×X×X =
P(Rm)×Rm×Rm describe a data set. Deﬁne D = {(S, x) : ∃t ∈ T such that (s(t), e(t)) =
(S, x)} and C:D → Rm by C(S, x) = {c(t) : t ∈ T and (s(t), e(t)) = (S, x)}. Clearly, C
is a well-deﬁned selection function.
Now consider the following procedure to move from a selection funtion to a data set.
Suppose X = Rm, D is ﬁnite, and C:D → P(X) = P(Rm) is a selection function. Let
|T | = ∑
(S,x)∈D
|C(S, x)|
and T = {1, . . . , |T |}. Let g: {1, . . . , |D|} → D be a bijection. For all j ∈ {1, . . . , |D|}, let
fj: {1, . . . , |C(g(j))|} → C(g(j)) be a bijection.
For all t ∈ {1, . . . , |C(g(1))|}, let
(s(t), e(t), c(t)) = (g(1), f1(t)).
For all k ∈ {2, . . . , |D|} and for all t ∈ {∑k−1j=1 |C(g(j))|+1, . . . ,
∑k−1
j=1 |C(g(j))|+|C(g(k))|}
(provided that |D| > 1), let
(s(t), e(t), c(t)) = (g(k), fk(t−
k−1∑
j=1
|C(g(j))|)).
The above constructions allow us to go back and forth between selection functions
and data sets. Note that, of course, the data set derived from a selection function is
not unique because the assignment of triples of feasible sets, reference points, and chosen
points to T is arbitrary.
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